DV COMPENSATION APPEAL BY MANAV KALIA

IN THE COURT OF DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE;

DWARKA DISTRICT COURTS AT NEW DELHI

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.                  OF 2012.

 

IN THE MATTER OF:-

 

    MANAV KALIA …. APPELLANT (ORIGINAL RESPONDENT)

         R/O

         501 SARGODHA APARMENTS,

         PLOT 13, SECTOR 7, DWARKA,

         NEW DELHI 110075                                                     

 

VERSUS

 

1. SHILPA KALIA …. RESPONDENT (ORIGINAL COMPLAINANT)

         R/O

         D- 204, ANUSANDHAN APPARTMENTS,

         PLOT 22 SECTOR 6, DWARKA,

         NEW DELH 110075

 

2. State (NCT of Delhi)         …. RESPONDENT

 

 

CRIMINAL APPEAL U/S 29 D.V. ACT, U/S 397 READ WITH U/S 386 Cr.P.C. AGAINST THE JUDGEMENT OF THE RETURN OF STRIDHAN AND PAYMENT OF RS. 10,000 PER MONTH TO HIS SON DATED 13/07/2012 OF CC No.856/1 OF 2010 PASSED BY Ms. PURVA SAREEN; LEARNED METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE, MAHILA COURT, DWARKA COURTS, NEW DELHI

 

MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH:

 

BRIEF FACTS

 

1. That the appellant is a well educated person with an engineering degree and an MBA degree from the leading institutions in the world in the respective disciplines. That the appellant was born on 16/10/1974 and is aged about 37 years.

 

2. That the appellant met the respondent on 17/10/2002 through common friends and got married to the respondent on 29/11/2003 in a love marriage after knowing the respondent for well over a year prior to the marriage. That the respondent was divorced from an earlier marriage that had lasted a few hours or a few days on paper, for reasons best known to the respondent.

 

3. That the respondent was a physically attractive, intelligent, strong willed, fiercely independent, and fun loving girl, which was in perfect sync with the appellant’s own mindset, so the appellant developed a serious liking for the respondent very soon, which was mutually shared by the respondent, which turned into an emotional attachment over time, for both parties, and led to their marriage, with the consent and the blessings of their respective families.

 

4. That the appellant and the respondent were aged 29 years and 27 years respectively at the time of marriage. That after marriage both parties started residing with the appellant’s parents in a house in Vasant Kunj which was owned by the appellant’s parents. That it is stated by both the appellant and the respondent as a matter of record in their submissions to the Honorable Court of the Ld. MM that no dowry was given or taken prior to the marriage, during the marriage, or at any time after the marriage, till current date.

 

5. That since the appellant and the respondent were both very strong willed, and strongly opinionated in their beliefs, after some time it led to ego clashes and temperament mismatches among them. That their son, Aron Kalia was born on 16/03/2005, and soon the respondent started using the child to get her way with the appellant.

 

6. That this emotional blackmailing of the appellant’s feelings for his son by the respondent, slowly eroded the sentiments and emotions that the appellant had for the respondent, and led to the ultimate dissolution of all the sentiments and emotions of the appellant in a couple of years. And that the respondent became very bad tempered towards the appellant after the appellant’s sentiments and emotions for her started dissipating.

 

7. That soon after their son was born, the appellant moved to his own house in Dwarka with the respondent and their son, to give their son more space to play while growing up. That the respondent has not lived with the appellant’s parents since then, and the same has been admitted by the respondent on record in her submission to the Honorable Court of the Ld. MM.

 

8. That the respondent had taken all the stridhan articles with her on her separation with the appellant’s parents needing them for her frequent use. In May 2007, the appellant found employment in M/S Watson Wyatt Worldwide and since his workplace was located in Gurgaon, he took up a house on rent in Gurgaon to save the time of commute between his home and his workplace, and moved with the respondent and their son to that house.

 

9. That the appellant suffered a major brain stroke on 25/01/2009 while residing with the respondent and their son in Gurgaon. That this brain stroke permanently damaged around one third of the left side of his brain. That this damage has permanently destroyed the areas of the brain that are responsible for language ability, physical movement of the right hand and arm, and memory retention. That the respondent has also affirmed on record, in her submission to the Honorable Courts of the Ld. MM, that the appellant had suffered a brain stroke on 25/01/2009 while she was living with the appellant.

 

10. That the damaged area in the brain is incurable and irreparable by any medical treatment. That the appellant had completely lost his language abilities and movement of his right hand and arm as a result of the stroke. That the appellant has to undergo constant medication, regular physio therapy, regular speech therapy and needs personal care and supervision due to his medical condition.

 

11. That due to this medical and personal care the appellant has recovered a lot, but still suffers from impaired ability to speak, read, write and type, a very weak right hand and arm, extreme physical weakness, and long term and short term memory problems. That the appellant also suffers from various other more minor medical problems as a result of his stroke. That the appellant had submitted all his medical documents affirming the above mentioned medical condition and the various treatments to the Honorable Court of the Ld. MM.

 

12. That the respondent had refused to take care of the appellant in his critical medical condition, in their matrimonial home in Gurgaon after his discharge from the hospital, due to her bad temper towards him, and treated him very badly in his precarious medical condition. That as a result of this mistreatment the appellant had separated from the respondent and had started living with his parents in a house in Dwarka which was owned by his parents, since March 2009.

 

13. That the respondent after a few months of separation moved to the nearest vacant accommodation that she could find near the residence of the appellant’s parents in Dwarka and has been staying there since separation at a few minutes walking distance from the house of the appellant’s parents.

 

14. That the respondent has been earning adjectives, like weird, strange, abnormal, bizarre, crazy or funny from normal sane people in society for moving her residence over a large distance to stay in abnormally near proximity to her ex-sexual partner of many years after separation from him. That according to them, it is totally contradictory to the norm of normal sane society, and that only animals or tribal people can have sex with someone for many years and can then stay in very close proximity with that someone after they are separated, and not normal, sane, civilized and educated human beings. Especially keeping in mind the large amounts of money and time the respondent is wasting everyday in her commute to and from her workplace in Gurgaon and her residence in Dwarka, which is about Rs. 20,000 per month and more than two hours in busy traffic every day.

 

15. That after more than a year of separation when the appellant and the respondent went in for a mutual divorce on 16/07/2010, the respondent did not appear at the time of the first motion on 05/10/2010 and expressed a desire to remain married to the appellant, and to not go ahead with the mutual divorce first motion, leaving the appellant no option but to withdraw the mutual divorce petition which needs the consent of both the parties. That this sequence of events is a matter of record and the appellant had submitted certified copies of the daily orders of the mutual divorce proceedings to the Honorable Court of the Ld. MM.

 

16. That subsequently on learning of the appellant’s desire to file for divorce the respondent filed an application against him under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, (hereafter referred to as D.V. Act) on 16/11/2010 in the Honorable Court of the Ld. Mahila Court at Dwarka, Delhi.

 

17. That the appellant after receiving a date for replying to the D.V. Act application from the Ld. MM on 20/01/2011, filed for divorce on the basis of cruelty on 11/02/2011 in the Family Court of Ld. Principal Family Court Judge MS DEEPA SHARMA at Dwarka, Delhi.

 

18. That the D.V. Act was instituted on the basis of the woman being the weaker gender. That the use of this act in the present case is an absolute travesty of justice and is just being used as a tool to harass the appellant and to exploit his already weakened health. That the very basis of this act does not hold true in the present case as any human with extensive permanent brain damage of the kind that has been sustained by the appellant, is by medical definition physically, mentally, economically weaker than any human of able body and mind, man or woman, by virtue of medical fact and  medical definition.

 

19. That after the appellant had filed for divorce, the respondent filed a complaint against the appellant and his mother in June 2011 in the CAW cell of the Dwarka, Sector 9, Police Station, and subsequently an FIR was lodged by the respondent against the appellant and his mother on 10/01/2012.

 

20. That the contents of the FIR are in stark contrast to the contents of the D.V. Act application filed by the respondent. As a typical example the respondent has repeatedly stated in the D.V. Act application that she enjoyed a good equation with the appellant’s parents and they both used to save the respondent from the torture inflicted on her by the appellant, throughout the marriage.

 

21. That in the FIR the respondent has stated that the mother of the appellant tortured her during the marriage. That as either a person can save a victim from torture or inflict torture upon a victim, thus to do both at the same time is impossible in the view of normal sane possibility. That a victim of torture enjoys a good equation with the torturer is a similar impossibility. That the FIR is littered with such impossible to be true contradictions, and the respondent should be punished for filing a false FIR in accordance with the law.

 

22. That in August 2011, due to the above mentioned complaint, the appellant’s parents requested him to vacate their house not wishing to be dragged into any needless controversy for no fault of theirs, as they had not even been residing with the respondent for over five years, and the appellant has been residing in a house owned by his grandmother, which is very near to the house of the appellant’s parents, since then, till current date.

 

23. That the D.V. Act application filed by the respondent is also littered with absurd allegations which are not even possible in the real world, as had been pointed out by the appellant in his various submissions, and which is also affirmed by the Ld. MM in the D.V. Act interim orders, dated 19/03/2012, in which order, the allegations of the respondent are termed as baseless, without any gravity or “bizarre” by the Ld. MM. And as has been stated by the Ld. MM in the D.V. Act final judgment dated 13/07/2012, in Para 13, that the very averments of the respondent did not amount to any act of domestic violence by the appellant, probably due to their absurdity, implausibility and contradictory nature, but definitely due to the reasons best known to the Ld. MM, the Ld. MM having perused the entire case file including the Domestic Incident Report.

 

24. That the respondent in her submissions leveled vile and filthy allegations at the appellant of sexual abuse, beatings, dowry harassment, torture, and child abuse, throughout the marriage, thus alleging him to be nothing short of a monster disguised in human form. That the respondent after leveling these vile and filthy allegations at the appellant is opposing the divorce petition filed by the appellant and expressing her fervent desire to stay with, or stay married to the appellant in the Honorable Family Court where the divorce petition is pending.

 

25. That this insane fixation of the respondent to stay married to, or to stay with, or to stay in abnormally near proximity to a man, wasting a large amount of time and money in the process, a man whom she herself alleges to be nothing short of a monster has concretely reinforced the opinion of normal sane people in society that are known to the appellant, that the respondent is very weird, strange, abnormal, bizarre, crazy and funny and that they have never seen or heard of a normal, sane, educated and civilized human girl like this, anywhere. That this opinion of normal sane people in society as to whether they have not seen or not heard of any normal, sane, educated and civilized human girl exhibiting such behavior in the modern civilized world, can be verified by the Honorable Appellate Court.

 

26. That the appellant apart from deriving amusement as would be the natural human reaction of any person on hearing adjectives like weird, strange, abnormal, bizarre, crazy or funny describing the respondent, constantly from normal sane people like his neighbors, other than that the appellant does not wish to associate, in any which way, with the respondent for the remainder of his natural life.

 

27. That it is pertinent to mention here that no brain stroke patient has ever faced any matrimonial legal case against him anywhere in the world. That the respondent had not submitted any complaint to any authority in the first seven years of married life, when she was living with the appellant, and when the appellant was in good health and could be even considered capable of any domestic violence. That the respondent had filed the first complaint against the appellant namely the D.V. Act application after the appellant was already staying separate from her for nearly two years. That the respondent had filed this first complaint after the appellant was already battling against his precarious medical condition, and not even capable of committing any domestic violence as per the medical definition of his condition. And that the respondent filed this complaint after forcing the appellant to withdraw the mutual divorce petition.

 

28. That the appellant was not able to undergo the stress and strain of the litigation in his medical condition, as would be true for any other brain stroke patient in this world and was regularly submitting his medical certificates to that effect and had even filed a mercy application for disposal of the case on 05/01/2012.

 

29. That the Honorable Court of the Ld. MM had taken this above mentioned application on record, but for five months did not take any action on the application. That thus by such inaction by the Honorable Court of the Ld. MM, which was hampering his recovery of health, the appellant was forced to plead guilty due to his medical condition and pray to the Honorable Court of the Ld. MM for complete justice in the matter given the uniquely peculiar facts, circumstances and conspectus of the case, in his application to the Ld. MM on 04/06/2012.

 

30. That the right to life and liberty in Article 21 of the Constitution Of India, which is the most fundamental of rights in the constitution also includes the right to health as decreed by the Honorable Supreme Court Of India. That it is imperative on any Honorable Court in India to protect this right, and not to violate it, under any circumstances.

 

31. That given these uniquely peculiar facts and circumstances the Ld. MM had given the final judgment of the D.V. Act case on 13/07/2012, and in Para 13, had absolved the appellant of all charges of domestic violence by stating that,

                        

                       “No order as to the compensation is made as

                       there is no averments of any incidents of domestic

                      violence made by complainant in her compliant. No

                     further order as to the residence is passed for by the  

                     complainant”.

 

32. That while the appellant is grateful to the Honorable Court of the Ld. MM for the final judgment absolving him, the final judgment had directed the appellant to return the stridhan articles to the respondent and pay Rs. 10,000 to his son every month. That these two orders are not as per the correct interpretation of the law. Hence the appellant humbly desires to appeal these orders.

 

GROUNDS OF CHALLENGING THE ORDER / JUDGEMENT

 

1. That in Para 13 of the final judgment dated 13/07/2012 the Ld. MM has stated that

                       “The respondent is further directed to return all the

                         stridhan articles of the complainant back to her or in

                       alternate pay Rs.5 lacs to her.”

 

2. That the respondent has stated as a matter of record in the D.V. Act application that the stridhan articles are in the possession of the appellant’s mother. That based on this averment of the respondent, the Ld. MM in the interim orders dated 19/03/2012 in Para 12 has stated that

                           “Now, applicant has averred that her jewelry is in

                           exclusive possession of her mother in law but it 

                          appears to be a bizarre averment. She has not

                         explained as to how her mother in law who is not a

                         respondent in the present matter happened to be in

                         exclusive possession of her jewelry which must be  

                       in her own use also and so is the situation with the

                      other Istridhan articles. Lot needs to be proved by  

                     applicant as far as this aspect is concerned.”

 

3. That the appellant is nonplussed at how an averment that has been termed “bizarre” by the Ld. MM on 19/03/2012 has been suddenly been turned into the gospel truth by the Ld. MM on 13/07/2012 without any further submission by the respondent.

 

4. That the appellant has not stayed with his parents in the last six years, apart from a couple of years after his brain stroke when he was very unwell due to the same. And that the appellant had pleaded guilty to all charges against himself to protect his fundamental right to health, and he did not plead guilty to the guilt of any third party or of his mother. And that on the appellant asking his mother about the same, the appellant’s mother had stated that the stridhan was in the possession of the respondent ever since the respondent separated her residence from that of the appellant’s mother, since the respondent needed the stridhan jewelry for wearing the same to the weddings and other functions of family and friends frequently.

 

5. That even if the stridhan has somehow found its way over into the possession of the appellant’s mother, even then how can the appellant be asked to return something that the respondent has herself flatly stated does not reside in his possession, but exclusively in the possession of his mother. And the respondent has not stated any involvement of the appellant in any matter pertaining to any stridhan at any time of the marriage in her D.V. Act application to the Honorable Court of the Ld. MM.

 

6. That by the same logic, if the respondent’s mother should commit any crime, then the respondent should be penalized for that crime. That this logic violates even the basic principles of common sense. That any aspect of law cannot be in violation of basic common sense.

 

7. That since the appellant cannot possibly return something that is not in his possession, and that is as a matter of record, agreed to by both parties, and also agreed to by the Ld. MM in Para 12 of the interim orders dated 19/03/2012, the Ld. MM has erred in the question of the law.

 

8. That hence the Honorable Appellate Court is humbly requested to set aside the order given to the appellant to return the stridhan to the respondent by the Ld. MM, as the order of the Ld. M.M. is against the settled principle of law and as such suffers from substantial illegality and hence is liable to be set aside.

 

9. That the order to pay Rs. 10,000 to the appellant’s son every month is similarly not in accordance with the relevant law, that is Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, “Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents.“

 

10. That Cr.P.C. Section 125 (1) (b) states that “If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself.”

 

11. That in Para 12, of the final judgment dated 13/17/2012, the Ld. MM stated that the interim orders dated 19/03/2012 stands as it is, to pay the appellant’s son Rs. 10,000 per month. When in fact the application submitted by the appellant on 04/06/2012 clearly pointed out the illegality of the interim maintenance order, requesting the same to be revisited by the Honorable Court of the Ld. MM when passing the final judgment.

 

12. That the Ld. MM has mentioned in the interim orders dated 19/03/2012 in Para 16 that

                        “Respondent has suffered serious incapacities but

                        has also positively recovered although still under

                         treatment. He was earning handsomely as reflected

                        from his Income Tax Return prior to his accident. He

                       has incurred expenditure of somewhere around Rs.

                      Seven Crores after suffering stroke. He has not

                     clarified or explained as to from where did he gather

                    these Rs. Seven Crores from. It is understandable that

                     his income must have substantially decreased but not

                   so minimal that he cannot sustain his child.”

 

13. That the appellant is nonplussed, as to how the Honorable Court of the Ld. MM has arrived at figure of Rs. Seven Crores. That nowhere in his submissions, the appellant has averred to a figure that is even in the vicinity of Rs. Seven Crores, as his medical expense. That to the best of his knowledge, no middle class citizen of India, has even spent anywhere near this amount in a span of a few years on his medical treatment. Thus the Ld. MM has erred on the question of fact as per records.

 

14. That since a brain stroke is a very rare medical condition, and there has been no matrimonial legal case against a brain stroke patient, to guide as a reference, the Ld. MM has erred in the question of law, overlooking the fact that it is not medically possible for a person in the medical condition of the appellant to earn enough to even sustain himself, as affirmed by the various medical documents submitted by the appellant, including his hospital discharge records, his MRI reports of his brain scan, and his latest medical certificates, based on which the Ld. MM has made the observation about the serious incapacities that the appellant has suffered and that the appellant is still under treatment.

 

15. That the Ld. MM on the one hand is stating the serious incapacities suffered by the appellant and that the appellant is still under treatment, and on the other hand the Ld. MM is stating that the appellant’s income would be sufficient to sustain his child. Whereas the appellant has stated his medical condition very clearly in Para 11 in the section containing the brief facts of this case in this submission to the Honorable Appellate Court.

 

16. That the very same medical condition mentioned in this submission, is affirmed by various medical documents that the appellant had submitted to the Honorable Court of the Ld. MM. The appellant is very certain that a person in the medical condition of the appellant cannot earn sufficiently to sustain even his own self. The Honorable Appellate Court can confirm this from other brain stroke patients in India in the medical condition as that of the appellant.

 

17. That obvious logic such as a person not having sufficient means to sustain himself cannot have sufficient means to sustain his child need not be explained any further. That this is further affirmed by the fact that no brain stroke patient has ever been ordered to pay child support maintenance.

 

18. That hence the words “sufficient means” that is a core principle of deciding maintenance under Cr.P.C. Section 125 (1) (b) is not maintainable in this instance.

 

19. That furthermore, since the appellant has stated in his submission dated 07/02/2012 in the Honorable Court of the Ld. MM in Para 4, that he wishes to bequeath all his movable and immovable assets to the respondent, that the respondent would obviously use them for the child.

 

20. That the appellant has also stated in the same Para mentioned above that in the future any income that the appellant earns on his recovering sufficiently as to being able to work, that of any  such income after taking out his own basic living and medical expense, the remainder can be given to the respondent, for the welfare of their child.

 

21. That the appellant is very confident that there is a significant amount of money residing in his unclosed bank accounts, or with his previous employers, or with his previous employee provident fund accounts, or with people who owe him money, since he has never cared about money his entire life, and so he never bothered to acquire such money.

 

22. That after his brain stroke he is unable to recall their details and due to his medical condition he is unable to pursue them. And that the appellant had repeatedly asked the respondent to acquire that money and use it for the welfare of their son. And that the respondent can acquire all such money and use it any which way she wants to, as consistent with the appellant’s statement to bequeath to the respondent all his movable and immovable assets mentioned above.

 

23. That the appellant is aware of only five or six brain stroke patients in this world who have shown continuing recovery after more than a year after the occurrence of a brain stroke. That there is a swelling near the damaged areas of the brain that subsides over the maximum period of one year and results in some possible recovery over a maximum period of one year from the stroke normally for brain stroke patients, as the maximum time for any swelling in the brain to subside is limited to one year.

 

24. For the extremely rare brain stroke patients who display continuing recovery beyond one year there is no medical explanation apart from their near superhuman will power, since brain damage is permanent and incurable.

 

25. That since the appellant is still showing continuing recovery after more than three years since his brain stroke and is one of those few extremely rare brain stroke patients, he is positively confident, that if the legal process does not stunt his progress and recovery, then in a few years he would be able to regain enough of his ability to work and earn sufficiently as to pay much more than the compensation ordered for his child, since he would retain his highly creditable qualifications throughout his life.

 

26. That hence the words “neglects or refuses to maintain” that is also a core principle of deciding maintenance under Cr.P.C. Section 125 (1) (b) is also not maintainable in this instance.

 

27. That in Para 17 of the interim orders dated 19/03/2012, the Ld. MM has stated that

                           “Thus considering the conspectus of case noting

                           that maintenance of child is the responsibility of

                           both the parents.”

Thus establishing that the maintenance of the child has to be borne by both parents in the ratio of their respective incomes. That the same is also in accordance with the principles of law.

 

28. That in the present case the respondent has stated on record in her submission to the Honorable Court of the Ld. MM that she is earning Rs. 40,000 per month when in fact she is earning a much higher amount than that and that she has not submitted a single financial document affirming this self stated income of her’s in any of her submissions to the Honorable Court of the Ld. MM. That this is stated by the Ld. MM in Para 13, of the interim orders dated 19/03/2012 that

                

              “Applicant has been an earning lady presently getting

              salary of Rs. 35,000/- + Rs. 5,000/- (as conveyance).”

 

29. That the appellant has submitted all his Income Tax records, PAN details, bank accounts, employment records that were available with him, in the same Honorable Court of the Ld. MM. That as per records the ratio of the respective incomes is 40,000 to Zero. And that clearly makes the appellant’s share of the maintenance of the child to be zero, while the respondent is morally, ethically, and legally bound to put in her share of maintenance for the child which has been decided by the Honorable Court of the Ld. MM as Rs. 10,000 per month, going by the admission of the Ld. MM that the maintenance of the child is the responsibility of both the parents.

 

30. That this one sided application of law by the Ld. MM to take the averments, of the respondent, that are not even attested by any shred of evidence, as the gospel truth, and to not even consider the averments of the appellant, even though they are attested by every possible financial and medical evidence, completely violates the principle of natural justice by the Ld. MM.

 

31. That the appellant has not self inflicted himself with a brain stroke so as to escape any maintenance, but has suffered a brain stroke which is a freak accident of nature and occurs in less than 1 out of 10,000 people, and it is not his fault, but an unforeseen and unfortunate mishap which occurred in his life. A brain stroke being one of the most debilitating afflictions a human being can encounter as can be confirmed by medical experts.

 

32. That the Ld. MM has clearly not made the very visible distinction between a man who is unable by forced circumstance to pay and a man who is unwilling to pay in spite of favorable circumstances which is the essential basis for deciding maintenance under Cr.P.C. Section 125 (1) (b).

 

33. That hence the Honorable Appellate Court is humbly requested to set aside the order directing the appellant to pay Rs. 10,000 every month to his child, the said order not being in accordance at all with the law or with the principle of deciding maintenance under Cr.P.C. Section 125 (1) (b).

 

34. That it is also pertinent to mention that the address of the appellant is incorrectly stated in the final judgment dated 13/07/2012. The correct current address of the appellant is stated in this appeal.

 

35. That in Para 11 of the final judgment dated 13/07/2012 the Ld. MM has incorrectly attributed a statement to the appellant that the appellant has stated that would comply with whatever orders are passed in favor of him or against him.It has been stated by respondent in the court on the last date of hearing that he wanted to plead guilty owing to his medical condition and has prayed that keeping in view his medical condition order should be passed and he shall comply with whatever order the court passed in favor of him or against him.

 

36. That the appellant had prayed to the Ld. MM for complete justice and hence had stated that he would comply with any order which gives him a sense of complete justice, as consistent with his application, and had absolutely no reason to make any statement not in accordance with that, nor is any such written statement attested by him on any record in the Honorable Court of the Ld. MM.

 

37. That since the orders of returning stridhan and paying Rs. 10,000 per month obviously do not give him any sense of complete justice, nor have they been passed keeping his medical condition in mind, given the facts of the case, hence he is appealing against the same. That since the appellant still has impaired speech it is very much possible that the Ld. MM heard him incorrectly and hence has incorrectly attributed the same to him.

 

38. That the appellant has not filed any other appeal other than this.

 

39. That the appellant has filed the appeal within the period of limitation allowed for the appeal.

 

　

PRAYER

 

It is, therefore, humbly prayed to the Honorable Appellate Court to:

 

A. Call for the records and proceedings of C.C. No. 856/1 of 2010 from the file of the Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate, Mahila Court, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi

 

B. Modify the order dated 13/07/2012 passed by the Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate, Mahila Court, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi in C.C. No. 856/1 of 2010 after examining the legality, validity, propriety and correctness of the order, by setting aside the order to return the stridhan to the respondent and by setting aside the order to pay Rs. 10,000 to the appellant’s son every month.

C. Pass as any other orders in the interests of complete justice.

 

　

DATED : 13/08/2012                        Through

 

　

NEW DELHI                                                                         APPELLANT IN PERSON